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§3.8

Hard Cases Where Counterproof Is Sufficient But Not Conclusive

If the basic facts are established, the hard case is the one where counter-proof is offered, and it is
sufficient to support a finding against the presumed fact but not so cogent and compelling that such
a finding is required. In this in-between case, a presumption does not control in the sense of
requiring a finding of the presumed fact. Thus sufficient evidence that goods were carefully
handled or stored means the bailed goods presumption no longer requires a finding that bailee’s
negligence caused the damage.
The in-between case raises three questions: Does the presumption disappear completely? Can
the factfinder still find the presumed fact? Does the presumption protect this possibility? On these
points, practice varies widely among states, and because of the difficulties presented by the inbetween cases, states adopting their own versions of the Rules did not as faithfully follow the
federal model as they did in other areas. 1 The two main lines of doctrine and some intermediate
lines are explored below.
Approach of FRE 301
Rule 301 adopts the common law approach under which presumptions in civil cases affect the
burden of persuasion, and not the burden of persuasion. One version of this approach is
encapsulated in the expression “bursting bubble,” for it is said that presumptions in civil cases
burst like a bubble and disappear from the case when the other side offers counterproof that would
support a reasonable jury finding against the presumed fact, regardless whether the jury actually
believes or accepts the counterproof as persuasive. Many courts take the view that FRE 301
embodies this version of the common law approach. 2
As if to drive home the evanescent nature of presumptions under this approach, some courts say
§3.8 1. Among the 45 states that have adopted the Rules, 17 states have provisions that give at least some
presumptions more effect than the “bursting bubble” approach. Among these, 12 states provide that civil
presumptions shift the burden of persuasion (Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). At the opposite end of the spectrum, 18 states adopted
provisions similar to FRE 301, under which presumptions affect only the burden of production (Alaska, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia). Ten other states do not prescribe
by rule the effect of presumptions in civil cases (Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington). The other five provide that some presumptions shift the burden of
persuasion, while others shift only the burden of production (Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Oklahoma, and Rhode
Island).
2. In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2016); City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 258-259 (5th Cir.
2012); Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2011); McCann v. Newman
Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287-288 (3d Cir. 2006) (all holding that FRE 301 adopts bursting bubble
approach). See also Lansing, Enough Is Enough: A Critique of the Morgan View of Rebuttable Presumptions in
Civil Cases, 62 Or. L. Rev. 485 (1983).

that only “minimal” evidence is required to destroy the presumption entirely. To put the point
another way, it is said that the party opposing the presumption need only produce enough evidence
against the presumed fact “to withstand a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter
of law on the issue.” 3 In other colorful expressions that mix the various metaphors, it is said that a
presumption “smokes out” the opponent, and the presumption is then “put to flight” when the
opponent produces enough counterproof against the presumed fact. 4
Fortunately, the bursting bubble approach does not always mean a claim or defense that depends
on the presumed fact must fail. The natural probative force of the basic facts may suffice to support
a finding of the presumed fact (or the evidence as a whole suffices), 5 and sometimes the trial judge
gives an inference instruction that allows or invites the jury to make such a finding. But sometimes
the natural probative force of the basic facts is not a sufficient basis upon which to rest a finding
of the presumed fact. 6 Absent other evidence, the bursting bubble approach means that the party
who must prove the fact loses the case in this situation.
Consider the case where a claimant shows that 400 factory-packaged computers were turned
over to a trucking company for shipment but 140 of them were broken on arrival. The proof
supports an inference of negligence by the trucking company even if the handling and
transportation of the computers went smoothly. The initial proof does more than establish the basic
facts. It shows that the goods were properly packaged for transit and that damage to 140 of the
computers would not likely happen without the bailee’s negligence. Even without the presumption,
the trier could decide in favor of the claimant, and a jury should get the case.
But suppose the initial proof shows a shipment of 48 china plates was packed in boxes with thin
pads between them and that 20 plates were broken on arrival. The counterproof might indicate that
the trucking company carefully handled the boxes and nothing untoward happened in transit. The
initial proof brought the presumption into play. Under the bursting bubble theory, it disappeared
3. Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2011) (only “minimal” evidence needed to
rebut presumed fact and burst presumption bubble; testimony based on personal knowledge refuting the presumed
fact suffices to rebut the presumption).
4. E.L. Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1965) (“smoke out”); Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An
Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 16-17 (1959) (“bursting bubble”). Hence presumptions are like
“bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts,” see Mackowik v. Kansas
City, St. J. & C.B. R.R., 94 S.W. 256, 262 (Mo. 1906). They are also like “Maeterlinck’s male bee” (“having
functioned they disappear”), see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof,
68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307, 314 (1920). And see accounts of the bursting bubble theory in Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence at the Common Law, ch. 8 (1898); 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§2491(2) and 2498a (21) (3d ed. 1940).
5. See America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2000) (evidence rebutting presumed fact
may “neutralize” presumption, but “does not eliminate” evidence that “gave rise to the presumption”); Sorrentino v.
United States, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1076 n.4 (D. Colo. 2002) (even after bubble has burst, factual question of
receipt of letter in due course remains open; factfinder may find receipt by drawing inference from proof of
mailing).
6. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998); A. C. Aukerman
Co. v. R. L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

in the face of the counterproof. Here the natural probative force of the initial proof does not support
finding negligence by the bailee. One can expect substantial breakage of hand-packed china plates,
regardless of the care exercised by the mover. If the presumption is gone, the case is gone too,
unless there is other proof of negligence.
Reformist approach
There are other approaches to presumptions in civil cases, and the clearest of these is the
approach urged by the drafters of the Rules and now adopted in a dozen states. Under this reformist
approach, presumptions affect not only the burden of production but also the burden of
persuasion. 7 Long ago, evidence scholars led by Edmund Morgan concluded that allowing a
presumption to disappear (burst like a bubble) when the other side offered proof against the
presumed fact that a jury could reject (in other words, counterproof that left room for other
conclusions) underserved the purpose of presumptions. These scholars argued for the reformist
approach, under which a presumption does not disappear, even if the opponent offers counterproof
that a jury could accept in rejecting the presumed fact. Instead, this approach holds that a
presumption shifts to the opponent the burden of persuasion, and the case goes to the jury with an
instruction telling the jury that the opponent bears the burden of persuasion on the matter of the
presumed fact (an instruction that need not use the term “presumption” at all).
Critique of traditional approach
There are two reasons for rejecting the bursting bubble approach. First, a presumption often
embodies policy preferences that are underserved if the presumption disappears in the face of
counterproof that the trier of fact might reject—counterproof that is perhaps sufficient to support
a finding against the presumed fact, but not so cogent and compelling that the counterproof would
require such a finding. Second, as a matter of doctrinal coherence, it is simply impossible to
explain why a presumption requires a finding of the presumed fact in the absence of counterproof,
but disappears altogether (bursts like a bubble) in the face of counterproof that the jury can reject
(counterproof that is less than cogent and compelling).
Two modern examples help elucidate these criticisms:
First, consider the employment discrimination presumption construed in the Burdine case. If
plaintiff shows that she applied for an open job for which she was qualified and that she was not
hired, it is presumed that the reason was discrimination. In Burdine, the Supreme Court said this
presumption requires a finding for plaintiff if defendant offers no counterproof, but it ceases to
operate in that way if the defendant offers proof of nondiscriminatory reasons. Still, as the Supreme
Court said clearly in its followup decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center, the trier may infer
discrimination from proof of the basic facts and the defendant’s counterproof if the jury concludes
that the reasons given by the defendant are “pretextual.” 8 Under a bursting bubble theory, the
7. Counterparts to FRE 301 in the following states provide that presumptions put on the opposing party the burden
of persuasion: Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In some other states, at least some presumptions have this effect, while others have the
lesser effect prescribed by FRE 301. See note 1, supra.
8. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

plaintiff in Burdine would lose because the probative force of the basic facts does not suffice to
prove discrimination, and the counterproof, whether believed or not, would destroy the
presumption. 9 Clearly the policy basis for the presumption recognized in Burdine and St. Mary’s
Honor Center would not be well served if such cases were taken from the jury, and those decisions
mean that the presumption continues to play a role in the case. The policy underlying the
presumption expresses a preference for allowing the jury to decide close cases, and recognizes that
what the employer offers by way of reasons for not hiring or promoting the plaintiff (or giving her
a raise) may well be false and pretextual. Hence the Court chose an approach that ensured the
survival of the presumption in a lesser role of protecting the possibility of an inference favoring
the plaintiff.
Second, consider the black lung presumption construed in the American Coal case, which
involved a claim for permanent disability under the Black Lung Benefits Act. The coal miner
invoked a presumption established by regulation, arising on proof of being in the mines for ten
years plus certain medical test results, that he was permanently disabled from the disease. The
mining company offered counterproof in the form of medical testimony based on other tests
indicating the claimant had heart problems, not black lung disease. The company claimed that the
bursting bubble standard of FRE 301 applied and that the presumption was therefore rebutted. The
Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that under the Black Lung Benefits Act the presumption
shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 10 The claimant would have lost if the court had
applied the bursting bubble theory because the presumption would have disappeared, regardless
whether the trier of fact was persuaded by the counterproof. Again, this approach would have badly
served the policy basis of the underlying presumption, which is that miners suffering from the
disease that is so commonplace in that occupation should be compensated unless it is very clear
that their ailment has other sources.
Intermediate approaches
Given the criticisms of the bursting bubble theory, it is not surprising that courts have resorted to
other approaches to presumptions that reject the bursting bubble theory. There are three other
approaches that can be described as “intermediate” in nature because they give presumptions more
lasting effect than the bursting bubble theory, while stopping short of shifting to the other side the
burden of persuasion. These approaches are “reformist” also, but they are not as clear or easy to
apply as the simplest reformist approach under which presumptions shift the burden of persuasion.
These three other approaches, however, can be understood as permitted by FRE 301, at least until
502 (1993) (both citing FRE 301 without actually saying that it applies in the case; both saying the presumption
protects possibility of pro-plaintiff finding).
9. See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 520-526 & nn.9-10 (5th Cir. 1982) (proof of basic facts of
discrimination presumption may not support finding of discrimination if presumption drops away).
10. American Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 738 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1984) (FRE 301 does not apply;
Congress has “otherwise provided” by delegating authority to Labor Secretary who promulgated presumption). See
also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (construing other black lung presumptions and citing
FRE 301).

it is decided definitively that FRE 301 embodies the bursting bubble approach.
Substantial and uncontradicted
One intermediate theory holds that a presumption has continuing effect unless the counterproof
is “substantial and uncontradicted.” 11 By this approach, the bailed goods presumption takes the
case to the trier of fact despite counterproof of careful handling and uneventful trip. The case goes
to the jury not only in the first situation sketched above (factory-packaged computers are broken
on arrival) but in the second (breakage of china packed with thin pads), and the presumption
ensures this possibility unless and until the court decides the counterproof is substantial and
uncontradicted. An instruction conveys the message that a jury may still find the presumed fact.12
A problem with this approach is that it requires courts to draw yet another distinction relating to
the probative force of evidence. To the three recognized categories (insufficient, sufficient, cogent
and compelling) we add a fourth (substantial and uncontradicted), making something that is
already complicated even more so.
Believe the counterproof
Another intermediate approach that presumptions remain alive unless the factfinder believes the
counterproof. 13 The bailed goods presumption would take the broken china case to the trier of fact,
and an instruction would let a jury find for the claimant unless it “believes” the proof of careful
handling and uneventful journey. 14 This approach comes perilously close to shifting the burden of
persuasion because it seems to say the factfinder should decide for the claimant unless it thinks the
counterproof preponderates. 15

11. See United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380-384 (1st Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293,
297 (9th Cir. 1978); E. L. Cheeney v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1965).
12. Here is one way to put it: “There is evidence that the china was turned over to the bailee in good condition but
many plates arrived in broken condition, and there is evidence that the china was carefully handled and the trip was
uneventful. Based on this evidence, you may find that there was or was not negligence by the bailee and, if there
was, that it was or was not the cause of the damage.”
13. Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. Flores, 2004 WL 944904 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004), following Sutphen
v. Hagelin, 344 A.2d 270 (Conn. 1975) (should tell jury presumption applies if it disbelieves counterproof).
14. Here is one way to put it: “There is evidence that the china was turned over to the bailee in good condition but
many plates arrived in broken condition, and there is evidence that the bailee carefully handled the china and that the
trip was uneventful. If you believe the evidence that the bailee carefully handled the china and that the trip was
uneventful, you should find that there was no negligence. Otherwise, you should find that there was negligence and
that the bailee was the cause of the damage.”
15. If “believe the counterproof” does not shift the burden of persuasion, then it is hard to interpret. Perhaps proof of
careful handling and uneventful journey is only circumstantial evidence of due care, so it could be believed and yet
the trier might think due care was not shown.

Equipoise
The “equipoise” alternative offers a third intermediate approach. Here the presumption
requires a finding of the presumed fact unless the factfinder thinks the counterproof makes
nonexistence of that fact at least as likely as its existence. 16 The bailed goods presumption would
take the broken china case to the trier of fact, and it would find for the claimant unless the
counterproof makes due care or external cause at least as likely as negligence by the bailee causing
the damage. This approach gives a presumption the greatest possible effect short of shifting the
burden of persuasion. The drawback is that it has a self-defeating quality: An instruction would
tell a jury to find the presumed fact unless the evidence makes it seem as likely to be untrue as
true, which seems to convey what McCormick aptly called an “impression of futility” that could
“mystify rather than help.” 17

16. See Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 A.2d 721 (Me. 1959) (leading case adopting equipoise
approach) (later Maine adopted rule in which presumption shifts burden of persuasion); Speck v. Sarver, 128 P.2d
16, 20 (Cal. 1942) (presumption should persist until there is evidence that “persuades the jury that the non-existence
of the facts presumed is as probable as their existence”) (Traynor dissent).
17. ”You should find for the claimant on the issues of negligence and causation,” the instruction could say, “unless
you find that proof of due care or other cause makes it at least equally likely that the bailee was not negligent or did
not cause the breakage.” The critical comments quoted above are in 2 McCormick on Evidence §344 (6th ed. 2006).

